Foiled at Forest

A tactical recap of what to make of that formation, that performance by Jesus, and what it all means for the future (plus, an intro about José Mourinho for some reason)

José Mourinho did it again.

Last Thursday, his Roma drew 0-0 against Bayer Leverkusen to advance to the Europa League final. His side gave up 72% possession, 23 shots, and logged only 0.04 xG of their own. It was disgusting; it was beautiful; but I repeat myself.

For his next act, he’ll look to go a perfect 6-for-6 in European finals. What’s the secret? In his biography of the manager, Diego Torres said that Mourinho goes into big games with a seven-point plan:

1. The game is won by the team who commits fewer errors.

2. Football favours whoever provokes more errors in the opposition.

3. Away from home, instead of trying to be superior to the opposition, it’s better to encourage their mistakes.

4. Whoever has the ball is more likely to make a mistake.

5. Whoever renounces possession reduces the possibility of making a mistake.

6. Whoever has the ball has fear.

7. Whoever does not have it is thereby stronger.

Now, there’s a lot to interpret there, and I won’t do too much interpreting on your behalf (specifically the “whoever has the ball has fear” part). But among other things, this list came to mind when thinking about Pep’s newfound practicality in big games, particularly those away from home.

But this is an Arsenal newsletter, so I guess I should talk about Arsenal before we go too far.

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The season winds to a close on a disappointing note. As such, we find ourselves in search of a coherent narrative that will help us make sense of our disappointment. Was it the absence of Saliba? Was it the presence of Holding? Was it MENTALITY??! Was it the refusal of Arteta to change tactics, except when he did? Was it under-rotation? Was it a “dip” in Saka’s “form”? How about Partey’s? Was it a lack of ESR? Was it Vieira’s diet? Was it the leak of the new away kits? Was it the arrival of the Team Dog?

Damn it, I knew Zinchenko shouldn’t have honked that horn!

The silver-lining beauty of a conclusively disappointing game like the one against Forest was that it can serve as a handy Rorschach test for whichever story we seek to project upon it. There is likely to be some truth in whatever that is, so long as you don’t blame the dog.

But looking at it more holistically, all those factors have shown variance from game to game. There has, however, been one constant: in decisive games down the stretch — often “cup finals” for team and opponent alike — Arsenal have been the ones to make the big mistakes.

That was the case in the 18th minute, when Martin Ødegaard delivered one of his signature line-breaking passes to spring a goal … on the wrong net:

These mistakes — appearing early against the likes of Bournemouth, Southampton, and Forest — have allowed overmatched teams to comfortably sit back and force perfectly crisp play from Arsenal. Down the stretch, the team didn’t have enough of a margin of error to overcome them.

And as Professor Mourinho teaches us: the team who fucks up more tends to lose.

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That formation

Perhaps the most interesting facet of the game was a maiden voyage of a new lineup, featuring Jakub Kiwior at left-back and Thomas Partey at right-back.

Early on, we got a glimpse of what it’d look like:

Nothing too difficult to comprehend here. With the progressive incision of Zinchenko and Saliba missing, Arteta opted to compensate with a mirror image of his every-week 4-3-3, which inverts into a flat 3-2-5 in build-up, eventually settling into more of a 2-3-5 in advanced possession. Kiwior was to play “left White” and Thomas was to play “right Zinchenko.” With Jorginho playing the standard 6, he’d have to intentionally shade left to keep things balanced.

In practice, the game churned out some truly oddball passmaps:

Forest did Mourinho proud, allowing 82% possession, and making only 84 successful passes in total. Four Arsenal players completed more than that on their own.

What do we make of all this?

The first thing to understand is Partey’s role and positioning, and the degree to which he filled the boots of the full-backs who came before.

For reference, here is a typical Benjamin White action map at right-back, this time against Southampton:

And here is an action map of Zinchenko in the same game:

And finally, here is the map of Partey’s play against Forest on Saturday:

As you see, it carries much more in common with Zinchenko than a typical White performance. This was correct: he showed freedom laterally, and spent much of the game in relationist diamonds on the flank (instead of the more straightforward “pass and occasionally overlap” play of a typical White game). He was incredibly ball-dominant, going 111/123 (90.2%) and setting highs for completions, attempts, and passing distance.

Usually so constricted to a height limit, he even had an interior run through the box, resulting in a cross:

His play didn’t generate goals, and upon rewatch, I believe it had little to do with the set formation, the lineup, or the broadstrokes of Partey’s positioning. It had a lot to do with a recurring issue for Arsenal: timing.

No timing, no goals

They say you don’t pass to move the ball, you pass to move the opposition. I’d like to add an addendum: carries also do the trick.

Buoyed by the early goal, Forest’s block (let’s call it a 5-4-1) was frustratingly patient and disciplined — using the athleticism of their wide midfielders to upset the dynamism of Arsenal, in much the same way Everton and Newcastle did in their good performances. When they did act, it looked a bit like below.

Danilo sprints out to pressure Ødegaard, with everything covered behind, and the ball sufficiently advanced. Ødegaard plays it back to his only option:

Now, Danilo senses an opportunity, and tries to outrun the ball, nearly dispossessing Thomas before he can play it back to White:

With the ball back to White, Danilo slams on the brakes instead of pursuing. He refuses to get pulled out of the shape of their block by sprinting forward:

Now, when White carries it back up, he’s completely unchallenged on the ball:

And we’ll stop here, as it feels like the decisive image of the game: a ton of touches for White and Partey, generally high-percentage play, and notable periods of lethargy with White standing with his studs on the ball.

What’s wrong here? In a vacuum, very little: a little patience from a CB isn’t a problem in itself, and you’ll see the likes of Lewis Dunk doing this every week. But it must be done with an intention to provoke: to induce pressure and pull players around to open up lanes. That rarely happened on Saturday. Partey and White weren’t as willing to confidently carry up to markers as Zinchenko, Gabriel, and Saliba usually are — and as a result, the passing lanes were much narrower.

Not to make you miss him more, but here’s an example of how confident Saliba can be in such situations.

Against Manchester United, Saliba anticipated and intercepted an outlet ball out wide. Still gathering the ball, a pass to Ødegaard was likely to be intercepted. So instead, he pushes forward in a carry:

Now, he’s garnered the attention of Bruno and Shaw, but he’s not content leaving it backwards to White. He wants to move the defenders, namely Shaw, into a more advantageous spot:

As soon as he gets Shaw to shift his hips outside, Saka cuts in and Saliba plays it to him, kicking off an attack that can move laterally with ease:

His forward carries may have been what finally broke the dam against Bournemouth.

When teams sit back, what is often perceived as a passing issue can often start with the ball-carrier. With defenders feeling content to ignore the threat of a carry, they’re able to take a step back towards a passing lane, instead of forward to the carrier.

Here, the two Forest midfielders are able to cheat towards the lane instead of rushing up to Thomas:

And a straightforward pass is turned into a high-wire act:

A little earlier, Arsenal found themselves in the exact kind of situation you hope to manufacture against such a block. Saka has been doubled and dragged two defenders wide, and two defenders are also accompanying Ødegaard — this stretches the block and opens lanes:

Unfortunately, Jesus recognizes it a second late, and Partey is a little too methodical in getting the ball out. Once again, a player shading towards a passing lane is able to get in front of it:

This ultimately deflected towards Jesus, but still demonstrates some of the issues here:

• White and Partey (particularly White) weren’t quite bold enough in carrying the ball, and allowed Forest to sit back and shade towards passing lanes

• This serves to significantly narrow the margin of error in forward passing

• Decisive passes were then recognized a fraction too late, causing the player to either get intercepted (if he passed) or pull back and recycle (if he didn’t)

• This also made it tough on Jesus as a primary receiver of these passes, as the defenders had ample time to anticipate his moves

Make no mistake, though: Jesus had a stinker.

What do we make of Jesus, both this game and moving forward?

As noted, this was a one-two combo: One, Jesus often got the ball a fraction late, allowing defenders to crawl over his back. Two, Jesus had a rough one.

It was his worst game in an Arsenal shirt. Here is a map of his duels on the day — WyScout credits him with a success rate of 11-for-40:

Now, Jesus is here to create chances, so pure dueling % isn’t the right metric to judge his game by — some of his most-effective performances will look a little like this.

On Saturday, it wasn’t generally a problem of overambition. It was a simple story of bad first touches. Here, Jorginho plays him into the box:

…and he’s left to chase his touch ~10 yards away:

Flashback to the game in October that Arsenal won 5-0, and these are the exact kind of plays that were causing him to be so roundly celebrated.

Here, he held the ball up until Ødegaard could make his cut, and successfully created his second assist of the day:

In fact, he could have been credited with three assists in that one.

This begs the question: how has his form compared since his World Cup appearance and injury? To help answer that question, I pulled WyScout data:

The takeaways are unsurprising: he is doing almost everything he used to do, with some less success on the margins. This tracks with the eye test, in which he still looks his electric, high-effort self, but can be a fraction of a second less anticipatory, and a little less efficient.

I’ve posted this graphic a few times over the year, and will continue to do so. Here’s a snapshot of his fb-ref scouting report:

With his recent run of form — this game was a stinker, and he wasn’t too sharp against Brighton, either — and a pivotal summer window approaching, I’ve seen the question posed: Can a team with such ambition afford to have Gabriel Jesus as the striker?

My answer is, quite simply, yes. I offer three points in support of my case:

• The above graphic.

• He has 20 goals 4 assists in 38 appearances (23 starts) in the Champions League, the large majority of them as a striker.

• The team went 14-1-1 with him to start the season. He was one of the best players in the world for much of it.

Back in summer and early-fall, no player gave me the “this feels different” vibes quite like Jesus. He came on at half against Nürnberg and promptly ripped off two goals.

That is not to say he is perfect, or above criticism when he has a rough one like he did this week.

It’s also not to suggest that tweaks can’t be made to help him be more effective. Which brings us to my next point.

Trossard and the left

Earlier in the piece, we talked about how carries can pull defenders out of position. Perhaps no player does that as well as Jesus: he is not a striker who slips his man, he is a striker with a gravitational pull, sweeping up defenders in his orbit. This does not often result in a ton of space for him to shoot, but it does effectively create space for others.

This pairs perfectly with Martinelli. For all the handwringing about Jesus as a winger, or Martinelli as a striker — Lord knows I’ve wrung my hands there, with this enormous investigation into his best role — I think they’ve both basically found the outlines of an ideal situation: Martinelli as a half-forward winger, and Jesus as an expressive false-9, who can thrive with his back to the goal, and who swings out left a lot. I’m all for Jesus getting occasional starts out wide but won’t look to overintellectualize it.

Martinelli’s low-key superpower is using savvy moves to de-mark himself in the box, not unlike a Benzema. With all the chaos that Jesus creates, he is able to swoop in, lose defenders like a striker, and hawk deceptively-easy goals.

That is a little different to how Trossard interprets the role, and may induce a little concern about his pairing with Jesus. On one hand, it’s perfect: they both interpret their LW/9 responsibilities similarly, and can interchange with aplomb. On the other hand, it’s not: their efforts can be duplicative.

This was the case on Saturday. In one example, Saka is breaking down his defenders on the right, and Trossard, Xhaka, and Jesus are in a line near the far-post:

But as Saka winds up, you can almost feel the urge of all three players to drop into “Zone 14,” and impact the play further from the goal.

Saka whips in a malicious cross and nobody goes for it. It eventually bounces over the byline:

That’s one small example, but shows some of the nuance involved in these lineup changes, and the importance of Jesus playing with a player who de-marks and seeks goals close to the net. If Reiss was healthy, I would have loved to have seen him at left-wing, with Trossard in the left-8.

Xhaka hasn’t typically been able to impact game-states like these, and it was ridiculously the case against Forest. You can ignore his placement in that passmap, by the way, as it wasn’t indicative of him dropping deep: he just only really passed in easy build-up, and had almost no involvement up front: 0 touches in the box, 1 forward pass total, 0 crosses, 0 shots, 0 dribbles, 0 offensive duels won, 0 ball recoveries. Oy. Maybe I should have spent longer on that.

Perhaps most interesting was that, regardless of stylistic preferences, Trossard wasn’t playing Martinelli’s typical role. By virtue of the formation flip, he was actually playing Saka’s.

Saka’s job on the day, then, was to be possession-heavy and relationist, playing in rotational diamonds and dictating play. Trossard was to be more responsible for receiving changes of play, and quickly breaking down his man 1v1. Kiwior was overly demonstrative and conservative with his passing in the “left White" role, which made this difficult, and I’m not sure this is the best use of Trossard’s abilities anyway.

It’s an interesting thing to ponder for next year: if Arteta indeed looks to flip which full-back inverts based on the matchup, how does that impact the responsibilities of the right- and left-wing, respectively?

For my money, it seems to again call into focus the need for another flexible, dynamic 1v1 winger. Whether that’s Reiss or not, we’ll see.

🔥 In conclusion

I frankly didn’t expect to write so much on this one — a grind of a game, to be sure, and a real disappointment of a performance — but there were some subplots that nonetheless caught my eye.

I didn’t try to cover every aspect of the game, just the ones that intrigued me. Nonetheless, here’s my TLDR:

• The team has made too many mistakes to deserve a title.

• At their best, Arsenal exploits timing. Their movements and passes are immediate. When there is simply a beat of thought before a pass is sent — as there often is when players rotate in — there are compounding effects. They need to work on making this crispness more personnel-agnostic.

• Results aside, Partey and White eventually settled in and showed plenty of promise in this new shape; White hasn’t lost his vision at CB, and with a little more experience in this configuration, these two would have likely had the requisite polish and decision-speed to create multiple goals.

• However, they weren’t confident enough in their carries to provoke pressure, and as a result, passing windows were exceedingly narrow, and defenders could get the jump on balls forward, to Jesus and others. They just needed marginally more comfort to have made the thing work.

• Leaning to the right was OK, but Xhaka and Kiwior both needed to be much more assertive.

• Yes, Jesus was pretty woeful here, and that may have been decisive. Recency bias aside, he has largely been a revelation at striker, and in my opinion, is quite enough for this team to compete at the highest level. That said, he likely needs to be paired with a player who better de-marks himself without the ball, like Martinelli. This doesn’t have to be a wing — it can be a Xhaka replacement, or even by Trossard re-interpreting his role at left-8.

• This game helped me visualize the potential knock-on effects of the team “flipping” the shape at times — i.e., inverting the right-back into midfield, instead of the other way around. Namely, this will have impacts on the relative games of the wingers, and decrease some of the rotational support typically on offer at LW.

• The roster is still looking a little short of low-block busters at the moment.

• I’m glad Arteta used this formation, and am bullish for the future.

OK, that may very well be the final tactical recap of the year. Like you, I’m anxious to dive into some tier-five sources and baseless conjecture. Have some good stuff planned for you.

For now, happy Saka Extension Day to all, and to all a good night.

Happy grilling.

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