What went wrong against West Ham
Looking at Holding and Tierney’s impacts on the build-up; whether Arsenal "switched off"; the lack of a final pass; and whether this was Liverpool all over again
It was a dream start.
After the lineups got posted in the hour before kickoff, eyes naturally drifted towards the West Ham duo of Thilo Kehrer and Aaron Cresswell on the Arsenal right. With a wing ripe for the taking, the Arsenal players performed the early script to perfection, forming a relational diamond on the edge of the box.
Saka dragged Cresswell in, then went back to Ødegaard through Partey, all before a White overlap and cross cut across the goal for a Jesus tap-in:
White’s improved crossing repertoire is nice to see.
It wasn’t long before Martinelli was banging in more consecutive crosses to a disorganized side. Saka’s gravity had the usual impact, and Ødegaard ran unmarked for a free shot on goal to make it 2-0:
But how did these chances come to be? How did Arsenal catch West Ham so back-footed, and where did that advantage go later in the game? Was this really Liverpool all over again?
To start answering those questions, we must start in back.
The decision to play out the back
The plan for Aaron Ramsdale’s distribution usually offers helpful context for understanding how the coaching staff is approaching a game. The specifics vary, but a decent rule of thumb is this: more parity, more launches. Against the likes of City, Liverpool, Brighton, and Tottenham, for instance, Ramsdale has only played out the back on a goal-kick a single time.
The single time was against Liverpool, which didn’t go great. Ramsdale launched all 9 other opportunities.
Ramsdale’s launches are also a reliable part of the kick-off routine, regardless of opponent. The team often plays it backward to the keeper, who then boots it forward to a specific player, who is shrouded by a circumference of teammates looking to pick it up on the bounce.
This is likely for two reasons: strategic (i.e. putting pressure in the opponent half immediately) and psychological (i.e. getting the players in the mood for winning second balls from the whistle). Arsenal has been particularly good early in halves: in the first 15 minutes, they outscore opponents 10-2. In the first 15 minutes after half, they outscore them 17-7.
Booting it long was, notably, not the plan against West Ham. On the first pass of the game, the team ferried it back to Ramsdale, and announced their intention to play out from the back:
This was, again, likely for two reasons: strategic (i.e. Arteta believed that, even with Holding and Tierney, Arsenal had the qualitative superiority to beat West Ham this way) and psychological (after a hurried, almost nonexistent build-up performance in the second half against Liverpool, Arteta wanted them to rediscover their primary mode of playing).
You may be noticing the full-backs near the touchline in this phase. That’s not particularly unique to Tierney’s inclusion in the lineup, as Zinchenko often swings wide as the team looks to stretch the press before prodding for angles.
But however you remember the sparkling open period, there’s some nuance that may have drifted out of consciousness.
Within 19 seconds, Thomas was getting blocked on a through-ball:
…and within a minute, Declan Rice was intercepting another overambitious one, and turning it the other way:
Chekhov’s gun was then placed on a bookshelf. The play went on.
Things quickly settled down as Tierney increasingly rolled inside to join Partey in the double-pivot, giving him extra options. They also improved for another reason, which was — ducks — the decisive play of Rob Holding.
At 2’, Thomas laid it off for him. He drew pressure from Benrahma, and flicked it over to White:
We’ve covered this before, and De Zerbi makes it clearer every week at Brighton: you can’t play out from the back without the confidence to provoke pressure, purposefully. If you’re not able to pull players like this, you get more crowded midfields like we saw against Liverpool. By taking Benrahma out of the play here, White is able to carry it forward unobstructed. This is how a team who is deprived of transition opportunities can manufacture them.
A few minutes later, he opened his body up like he was going to lay it off to White, which is the obvious pass. This caused Antonio to switch off, which helped Holding find a lane directly to Ødegaard:
This pass directly led to the sequence that resulted in the second goal, and is proof-positive for why teams play this way (Craven Cottage being another example). With this one pass, Holding was able to cut out six opponents from the phase of play, and Arsenal progressed upfield quickly.
Though West Ham rushed back, they were ultimately less settled in doing so. Martinelli whipped in two crosses, the second of which resulted in Ødegaard’s goal above. It’s hard to imagine that degree of miscommunication by West Ham in more settled possession.
Rob Holding was a major character in my post-Liverpool article called The Case for Control, and not in a good way. In it, we documented how his hurried clearances and aimless long-balls were a proximate cause of the relentless barrage Arsenal faced. He’s no William Saliba, but was capable of better:
Rob Holding may be the one who needs to improve his appraisal of Rob Holding; there were more than a few times when he came down with a ball that he was fully capable of passing, but instead, he booted it in haste.
It makes for a cloudier narrative, but West Ham was a more secure build-up performance by Holding. He had a few incisive passes; he only attempted 6 long-balls (down from 17) and cleared it five times (down from 10). His overall passing volume, distance and completion percentage was on par with what we can expect from Saliba, though he was less progressive (319 yards of progressive distance, compared to a 432-yard average for Big Willy).
Still, his struggles were on the other side of the ball, and he was only an accessory cause for later issues in build-up. On Sunday, that blame lay elsewhere.
Did Arsenal switch off?
After the game, I was curious the degree to which Arsenal “switched off” after the second goal. The truth, as always, is more complicated.
Here’s a look at FotMob’s momentum graph, which amalgamates a few factors, including who has the ball and where, who is applying pressure, and more. Arsenal is in gold, with the period between goals outlined in yellow:
Next, I pulled WyScout data from different periods in the game, looking particularly at tempo (number of team passes per minute of pure ball possession), and some other factors. I added some quick notes on the bottom:
As you’ll see, the tempo didn’t go down after the second goal — with three more passes per minute, but longer sequences looking for the cutting moment. In truth, it looked very similar to the approach early in the game.
A few minor cracks started to show, but they did not determine the character of the contest at the time.
After one period of thoughtful build-up, Holding hoofed it over the top to nobody (I didn’t say he was perfect. My notes said “Ugh, another one. Fuck me”).
After another period of good work in build-up, the Zinchenko absence started to rear its ugly head. At 13’, Tierney swung wide, and then tried to play it back to the middle, but Bowen intercepted it and kicked off an attack the other way:
Tierney and co. snuffed this out. Something I’ve noticed is that there is some method to Zinchenko’s rotational madness, and his teammates are generally fluid about rotating down to cover his freelancing. When pushing up and wide, Tierney isn’t always as covered in the rest defence, for whatever reason.
A little while later, Tierney is playing in the double-pivot, and Xhaka accepts it out wide. As the ball rolls towards him, Xhaka yells at Tierney to cut into the space and break the press. Tierney sees it too late and runs too languidly, and Xhaka is forced to give it back to Gabriel, and recycle possession:
These “jail-break” carries — Rice is gonna be sick at ‘em if he winds up at Arsenal — are a big missed opportunity in Tierney’s game right now. The Scot doesn’t need the touchline to show his bursts of carrying pace — there’s no real reason he can’t burst through the half-space with the same vigor. But Zinchenko currently outperforms him as a ball-carrier, despite less natural talent (and speed) at the trade.
At 19’, Jesus wins the ball after a free-kick and Tierney has it while West Ham is both over-committed forward and heavily leaning right. He doesn’t take the quick outlet pass to White:
…and eventually decides to put his studs on the ball and regroup, as Gabriel pleads with him to play it out wide:
These were not overly decisive moments so much as they were indicative ones. By and large, this period of the game was not that of a team who had “turned off.” As we’ve established, they were playing out of the back to start the game, as well — and doing so methodically, with bursts of attempted through-balls. It led to a period of solid control, some dynamism, but ultimately, no shots on target.
With Tierney having a couple touches where he didn’t have a forward verve in build-up, Jesus started dropping deep into his area to get things going. Which, in fairness, he does every game regardless of who is starting at left-back.
Then, Chekov’s gun went off.
The Thomas blunder
This moment all begins with Gabriel rotating over to support Holding on a through-ball to Antonio, where he was being targeted with regularity.
In the back, things are a little slapdash as Tierney gets the ball. Xhaka disappears from view to take Soucek out of the phase, and Tierney winds up without the most bountiful angles:
He plays it to Thomas. On the plus side, he’s all alone in the middle of the pitch. On the negative side, he’s all alone in the middle of the pitch, and doesn’t have an obvious pass to make.
…and as he dallies, Declan Rice comes bursting in from out of frame to pressure him — man, he accelerates so fast. Thomas makes a confusing decision to try and flick it around the last guy you should try that against, and we all know what happens next:
Things are a little rushed and disorganized behind, Gabriel goes to ground, and Paquetá gets a penalty.
After (and during) the Liverpool game, many pundits pushed the convenient narrative that Xhaka had riled up the crowd before the goal. Watching the telecast back, it was hard to hear a difference in their decibels — that is, until the goal went in.
Likewise, it’s hard to detect an enormous change in play-style after the second goal went in. Perhaps the truth is simpler: the team played largely in a similar vein, with some longer sequences, which makes sense; Zinchenko’s absence in urgency started to creep in a little; and Thomas had a huge fuck-up, which brought them back into the game.
After the first West Ham goal
After West Ham made it 2-1, the team was not without its characteristics. Their pressure and tempo levels were still high. But a few moments of inexactitude meant that it didn’t turn into a shot on goal — like that weird one where Martinelli blocked an Ødegaard pass.
There was also this one, where Thomas had all the time in the world again, and mishit the pass by ~10 yards, far over the touchline:
…but then there were two more big mistakes right after half. The first was, obviously, the Saka miss — which was enormous, though not that interesting to analyze.
Then, there was a team mistake. After a throw-in, Gabriel heads it away, Kehrer blasts it into the box, and the offside trap is all over the place.
Bowen exploits the gap and sneaks in behind to tie it up:
[Edit: I just watched this play back in response to a comment on the post, and am noticing the complexities. It was a long throw-in, and Gabriel was the one who headed it away, so he was naturally a little further up. Then I think he tried to set the line of the offside trap (he used his hand to give a "here" motion to everyone), but given how quickly Kehrer could play it back, he may have set it the line a yard high. Tierney was higher up so he could get closer to it (but didn't keep an eye on Bowen) and Holding/White couldn't make it. Without knowing commands, it's hard to lay exact responsibility, but it clearly wasn't coordinated well. My hunch is that Gabriel set a line his teammates couldn't quite reach in time.]
And it was in this period — the twenty or so minutes after the score went to 2-2 — where the performance ranged across the board from shit to fuckin’ shit.
At 58’, Tierney has options around, and Gabriel is asking for the ball. Instead, Tierney blasts it over the top to no one in particular:
At 59’, Jesus gets in on the action, clearing it high into the middle — where it’s Zouma, Rice, Soucek, Kehrer against Martinelli and Saka. I don’t think that’s a high-probability action:
At 60’, Ødegaard hits a pass — right as White starts a run. He boots it directly to the linesman:
At 61’, Gabriel and Tierney have easily beaten Jarrod Bowen to the ball, and Gabriel is asking Ramsdale to come out from his line to receive it. Ramsdale stays put:
…he’s now committed in the corner. As Holding and White ask him to play it around, like he originally wanted to, he cleared it out:
That’s not confident, top-of-the-table stuff.
It was during this period — after the second West Ham goal, and before the subs — that any accusations about lack of composure had their merits.
🔥 In conclusion
Things eventually stabilized as the subs came on and West Ham dropped back. Here’s their PPDA as the game went on:
Alas, the magic moment never came. But if that style of play had persisted throughout the second half, who knows.
For this piece, I wanted to focus in on the structural elements of the draw — I almost typed “loss” there, for the record — and steer away from the events with clearer takeaways: we all know Saka should have scored his penalty, and that Holding isn’t as fast as Antonio. Here are some thoughts:
Mistakes: We do have to start here. It’s a game of high-variance moments having disproportionate impact. We can talk about whatever we want, but those three mistakes (Partey/Gabriel on the first West Ham goal, Saka’s miss, and the team’s failure to hold a coherent line on the Bowen goal) were defining. If any of those turn out differently, so does the game.
Liverpool all over again?: Despite a similar result, this game had different characteristics to the draw at Liverpool. Arsenal decided (correctly, in my opinion) to confidently play out the back against West Ham, and their ability to do so led to the first two goals. Holding’s aimless long-balls and hurried clearances were a big part of the story last week. Against West Ham, less so. Whereas the Anfield game stats look like Anfield game stats — and show no hallmarks of “under-respecting” that opponent — the West Ham game has a lot in common with the season writ large in terms of possession, progression, completion %, long passing. There was another difference.
Cutting edge in build-up: Zinchenko’s absence put particular pressure on two players in build-up: Thomas and Tierney. They largely weren’t able to fill the void. Partey was mistake-prone and unable to adjust his game to the context of it; he had one club in his bag, and wasn’t helped by a less-assured pivot partner. When things were looking a little lethargic in build-up, Jesus and Xhaka started dropping into Tierney’s positions so he could go out wide. There’s no issue with Jesus doing that. However, Xhaka being too involved in build-up is usually a bad omen: it’s not his strength, and he often doesn’t have the wheels to then get back and be his most decisive self in the final third. The passing was generally crisp, but when there was an advantage, there was a lack of urgency from Tierney, who either opted for safe passes or low-percentage balls over the top. Thomas did show urgency, but executed poorly.
Build-up → Final action: As we covered, when the team successfully builds gaps in build-up, a lack of urgency will deprive this team of semi-transitional moments in the final third. That means more settled defending, which is harder to exploit. This, again, puts the Zinchenko void into full focus — one Partey and Tierney didn’t fill. In the current setup, Partey is not a regular part of final actions (first goal notwithstanding): he logs .82 passes into the penalty area per 90. For reference, that is a lower rate than Reiss, Trossard, Ødegaard, ESR, Saka, Zinchenko, Jorginho, Elneny, Martinelli, Xhaka, White, Vieira, Tierney, and Jesus. While Arsenal had 193 more touches than the Liverpool game, including significantly more in the middle and advanced thirds, they only had two more in the West Ham box. When the final pass is missing, the team needs two players most of all: Ødegaard and Jorginho.
Harried moments: If I had to pick moments for the team to watch in the tape room, it wouldn’t be the Big Mistakes. The learning process would be better focused on three areas:
Moments when the press was broken but the advantage wasn’t pushed
The period from 46-65’ of rushed clearances and pointless long-balls over the top, which had a lot in common with the second half at Liverpool
The first Arsenal goal, with relationist diamonds on the right side of the box. If they kept the ball over there, and hammered those movements over and over, they’re unstoppable.
Finally, here are some other, random notes:
I don’t have many interesting thoughts on the sub strategy, which always looks obvious in retrospect. Some bullets: I would have loved Jesus to stay on for the full-90, but I’m also not sure of his rehab plan … I liked seeing Xhaka as hybrid LB while pushing for a winner. More attackers, please … There was an argument for Jorginho to come on at half, but he came on early enough … While I would have preferred Saka to come off for Reiss or ESR, I don’t think Saka’s overall performance was anywhere near as disastrous its been made out to be. It was a 5/10 with a penalty miss, but not a 0/10. I’m not worried: as always, he’s got a stronger mindset than anybody commenting about him … I’ve never seen Ødegaard tired, so never really see a need to sub him off.
While Gabriel had a tougher individual assignment against Liverpool, it was still mostly on the home-left of the pitch. West Ham’s gameplan meant relentless targeting of Holding on the left on long-balls, which meant Gabriel swinging around a lot in support. The controlled chaos turned into chaos-chaos at times.
I want to investigate this more, but I’ve been watching Jesus dart around the box on opponent corners, and think he might be really influential on our set piece defending. I could be wrong, but I think we’ve only conceded one corner with him on the pitch — that time Douglas Luiz curled it in and Ramsdale got tackled.
I’m starting to think that Saliba and Zinchenko are good.
I think this lineup and this gameplan can beat all lesser opponents. With better play at the 6, more stubborn decisiveness in build-up, more composed control when the game gets dodgy, and more cutting passes into the box, this could have been a comfortable win. The foundational elements were all there. This team did already beat West Ham 3-1 with Tierney in back, after all. I’ll just go out on a limb and say they should fuck up less.
That’s why I’d roll with this team against Southampton on Friday. If familiar issues persist against the cellar dwellers, and Saliba is still out, different options should be on the table for Man City. In any case, I’d like to personally request fewer unstrategic balls over the top. For me.
This is a lot of hand-wringing for a top-of-the-table side who is undefeated in their last 9 league contests, no?
To be expected. I prefer this kind of stress.
Happy grilling everybody.
❤️🔥