Fine margins
A tour through fourteen topics currently facing Arsenal, and what can be done about them to turn the tide — including deep manipulation, central dribbling, shot selection, Nwaneri, Merino, and more
“Heat not a furnace for your foe so hot that it do singe yourself.”
— Henry VIII
There is so much to take in. A brilliant, understaffed, injury-plagued, dogged performance against Liverpool was rewarded with a Salah goal that felt inevitable — and a solitary point. Then came the Nwaneri game. After that, a beleaguered showing against Newcastle resurfaced a few real questions about tactics and personnel. On Wednesday, Arsenal bounced back with a generally energetic, domineering match to be proud of at San Siro — only to get footballed for the effort. The result: Arsenal have now lost three of the last six games in all competitions. Opta tells us that is the same number as the 32 games prior.
The team just isn’t scoring enough. There’s been some lousy luck. It feels like almost every match this year comes with three asterisks and four explanations. As a fan, it leaves things confusing, opaque, and frustrating.
Most concerning for these parts: Edu has scrubbed the grill, hung up his tongs, and left the premises. Looks like I need a new name for my newsletter. Suggestions are welcome.
But despair is not the order of the day. The dropped points are bad; there’s no sugar-coating that. But we’ve got our captain coming back, and we’re fresh off an underlying performance against one of Europe’s best teams that solidified our place in that tier. One doesn’t have to look far for reasons to hope.
Arteta saw plenty of good in Milan.
“What I sense as well is a big belief about how good we are as a team, and again what we did in Milan watching it back twice, I hadn't seen my team doing that against them.
But you need to take that into a winning football match because, in the end, that is the only thing that anybody is going to judge, not how superior you were to the opponent, that you outrun the opponent, you out-performed the opponent in every single way. It is about how they scored a goal and you didn’t. We have a problem, and the problem has to be resolved by scoring more goals than the opponent - that’s it.”
However stat-brained I can be, I’m still cautious about hand-waving concerns away to injuries and luck, however true. Real goal tallies still matter most.
In that spirit, let’s take a long look at some of the major topics facing Arsenal and see where we go from here.
To get a better view, we’ll start way back at the Liverpool match.
🛠️ 1. Assessing the build-up
👉 Progression against Liverpool: First Half
Errant insights can be drawn from “average position” graphics. For example: suppose a full-back spends half of their time up the pitch, and half the time down the pitch, and their average position circle winds up right next to a midfielder. In that case, you may see comments about how they were “on top” of that midfielder, even if they were never actually all that close. If a player has nobody close to them, they’re “stranded;” if somebody is right next to them, they have no space. That kind of thing.
In other words, a passmap is often just a Rorschach Test for us to project our pet gripes upon.
Still, with caveats, we can generally grab a few nuggets. Here’s what it looked like against Liverpool.
In that one, we saw a back-four, Rice running the show in the middle, and “twin 10s” of Trossard and Havertz doing their thing. The wingers are high and wide but Martinelli was more likely to receive high than Saka.
You’ll also see Merino. He was quite likely to receive high, but as we’ll see, he had a nuanced role throughout the game.
If you separate that match out into a few phases, here’s what it looked like from a lineup perspective.
The respective gameplans of Arsenal and Liverpool carried many similarities and were fairly easy to discern early.
Arsenal had a swath of players who could drop into the midfield and help with progression: Rice, Timber, Partey (from RB), Havertz, Trossard, Merino, and even Saka and White as needed. This flexibility was generally leaned upon.
As the game progressed, we’d generally see a box midfield like this — in which there is a true double-pivot of Rice and Merino, and both full-backs were playing like full-backs.
New Liverpool manager Arne Slot noticed.
The thing is if you face Arsenal with a manager that is working here for four or five years and he has done an incredible job here because his team can play in so many different set-ups. They always play 4-3-3, but the way they position themselves they can do – I think he said it once himself – 40 different set-ups. I don't know what he exactly said, but it is many different set-ups. So, you prepare a game plan, you expect something but you cannot tell your players 40 different options, so you try to prepare them in the best possible way.
He was surprised by some of the full-back rotations (or lack thereof).
Now they play with a false nine, which they do maybe more often, but they didn't come that many times with a full-back inside. We could prepare them at half-time a bit better from what we saw in the first half; we took some more risk, but I think the main thing was we just put more energy into it.
Something you observe when you watch games back is how much pressure is a cumulative property, and how many goals come after earlier warning shots. That was certainly the case for both sides in this one.
We’ll also cover how much of Arsenal’s success comes down to simple crispness deep. At 4’, Ben White received, awaited pressure, and hit it over the top to Saka, but the timing and weighting didn’t fully land.
That changed just a few minutes later. With Arsenal in a 4-4-2 box midfield with “Twin 10s” or “dual false-9s,” whatever you want to call it, Van Dijk is forced to respect Havertz. He has an urge to pinch down and help close down that space; he’s also a genius at high-lining and is trying to keep the line as high as possible. There is one problem, though.
Robertson is spooked by Saka’s speed. When Saka is fresh, he has a real ability to dart in these situations; he's often handling so much on-ball workload that it’s hard for him to flex this skill with enough volume.
We know what happened next.
It was another reminder of why a team like Newcastle surround him.
Eventually, Arsenal found joy by exploiting this right pocket. When Partey inverted, Havertz could drop even lower (to a spot where Ødegaard and Saka generally receive), and Van Dijk is left to defend air. In these situations, he’s likely to look for something to do, so he often squeezes up. At the same time, Robertson is playing scared.
Those movements disrupt the sanctity of the Liverpool line. Maintaining a line is up there with “skills that look easy on television but are really difficult in real life.”
This movement simply overloads the situation deep and gives Arsenal an easy path to finding the free man. It’s increasingly being used to combat presses like that of Liverpool, and Slot is still working through a few things concerning distances out-of-possession. As solid as they are otherwise, it’s pretty easy to bypass their first line.
Below, you’ll see Partey inverting, and Havertz dropping into that space. This leaves Mac Allister with an impossible job. So Trossard just drops into the space and gets it.
Trossard carried up, broke the press, and a high Merino was waiting. Newcastle wasn’t his best game, but against Liverpool, I was really impressed with his feel for space in these high pockets. It comes naturally for him.
In all, the right side dominated, and the Arsenal build-up was metronomed by Ben White and Declan Rice. White, playing at RCB, didn’t just float the ball over the top for the assist, but generally dictated play throughout.
In the following pass chart, you’ll see how often players delivered passes to certain teammates. The darkest shades are reserved for White, Partey, and Rice; from there, our Bu-kai-yo connection continued to bear fruit.
The passing patterns looked really nice early.
Things eventually stalled out. Why?
👉 Progression against Liverpool: Second Half
The second half of Liverpool was vaguely frustrating and a little inevitable. From a macro perspective, though, it didn’t look too concerning to my eyes. The team fought hard, but eventually, a backline of Partey/White/Kiwior/Lewis-Skelly surrendered a transition goal to Trent Alexander-Arnold, Darwin Núñez, and Mohamed Salah. Ugh.
We’ll get into that all later, including whether Arsenal decided to sit back or not. From a passing perspective, my critique from this period is that we were too happy to get the ball out of our box and invite another wave. With new connections across the pitch and players dropping like flies, the long passing numbers jumped.
In practice, it wound up looking like this.
White had a great game at RCB, so I’m not making a comparison. It’s this kind of vague, harmless clearance-slash-long-ball that was a calling card of a player like Rob Holding. It seems small at the moment, but it’s ultimately the reason why the opponent can sustain pressure.
In all, I’m not sure there’s much to deduce from the build-up against Liverpool beside “tough match, fought hard, slightly unfortunate.” At full strength, the structure and performance looked good, given the circumstances.
The same can’t be said about Newcastle away.
👉 The build-up against Newcastle
We’ll start where we left off. We just covered this against Liverpool:
We saw something a little similar early against Newcastle. Partey inverted from right-back, then swung over even further to make it a bit of a diamond.
This box setup was a way of reinforcing the middle against a difficult Newcastle press.
That extra lateral move from Partey dragged a lane open, allowing Trossard to receive and drive forward.
Looks good. I’m sure we saw a lot of that.
Right?
Right?
Not really.
Here was another novel movement that you may remember from such films as Timber Last Preseason, or Tomiyasu Beats Man City.
What’s fun in the clip is seeing how quickly Timber notices the space created by Merino dragging a player down. He’s running as soon as Raya touches the ball.
By and large, however, the progression felt slow, hitchy, and overly predictable. It’s easy to focus on struggles in the final third, but so much of football is about creating conditions so that players arrive in the final third with advantages. That didn’t happen. Newcastle, protecting a lead, were able to err to the side of defending — and masterfully executed another rough-and-tumble gameplan.
But it was also the fault of the setup and the personnel.
Let’s dive into some of the questions, problems, and works-in-progress of late.
🛠️ 2. Right inversion (with Timber LB)
Whereas the first half of Liverpool featured a swirling, modular midfield with all kinds of interesting quirks, the Newcastle setup was more straightforward: Partey basically inverted from right-back. The primary risk of that setup was avoided, again — Partey played well defensively — but there are other issues that I feel contributed to the static feeling of the performance.
At first glance, you’ll see very little wrong with the overall setup and distances.
But stare at it a little longer, and you’ll see the cracks:
With Partey inverting deep from right-back, Saka is now all alone. He gets a dose of what Martinelli usually feels like.
Trossard, not Ødegaard, is playing RCM here.
Timber is playing deep “LCB.” With Partey inverting by default, Timber is hanging around in a back three and finding specific moments to push up. But underlapping is tough up there in that situation, and even if he were to overlap Martinelli, he’d be wrong-footed and want to cut back.
When inverting from right-back, Partey will have to cover wide areas on a counter, and would logically be more risk-averse as a passer as a result.
Gabriel, not Saliba, is at CCB.
This partially led to moments like below. (Merino is trotting back from being the deepest man, so isn’t at fault here.) It is both true that a) Martinelli was put into difficult circumstances and b) Livramento won the battle on the day.
Here, you’ll see what kind of task Saka regularly faces. While Lewis Hall isn’t his most imposing matchup on paper, the remaining players are about as tough as it gets in world football: Joelinton and Willock, supported by Guimarães and Burn. This is without Ødegaard in the half-space.
But there is more in that above image. Look who is still in the middle: Partey, the right-back. Look who is out wide, highly unlikely to offer wide support or an overlap: Saliba, the “CCB.”
This dramatically reduces the chance that we see something like the below — in which White is holding width and Saka can get inside.
From a pure balance perspective — if not necessarily a performance perspective — things looked a lot better once Timber and White played RB and Zinchenko came on at LB.
This lineup looked “cold” but you’ll see how many subtle improvements there are to the original dynamics.
Saliba is CCB
White can hang back, underlap, or overlap in spurts
Somebody who can dribble and move the block is in the RCM (Nwaneri)
Partey doesn’t have to cover wide in the event of a ball loss
Overlaps can be a source of confusion. You can’t (or shouldn’t) simply wish an overlap to be. They have a cost: it requires a heavy sprint by your full-back, and it takes them away from your rest/transition defending apparatus. As such, you’ll want to make sure they’re worth it — and they often aren’t. Basically, you do it if you can outnumber a single defender, or if you can force a moving, difficult handoff between defenders. If two defenders are pretty close together, they can easily pass the baton — so it’s probably not the right opportunity.
When should you do it? When your batterymate is a true 1v1, and help has to arrive on the scene — forcing a coordinated handoff that may result in lateness or gaps.
All of this led to more numbers and cleaner associations on this side. While the play was not at the mind-melding levels of White/Ødegaard/Timber, and there were definitely moments where players like White and Nwaneri were not on the same page, the structural underpinning of the team looked more likely to create.
This was more true on the left, too, where Rice found more room to carry.
Timber has a place at left-back. Assuredly, the best time to use him is as a defensive stopper against the world’s top wingers. In those situations, he may even deserve the start over a healthy Calafiori. But in closer matchups, the surrounding circumstances matter a lot. If he can poke, prod, invert, underlap, overlap as he sees fit, he is more likely to be dynamic over there; but if inversion is purely coming from the right, and Timber is a more wide, deep left-back, his angles are closed and the role requires too many off-footed overlaps.
The setup against Inter was forward-looking and aggressive. Partey generally settled in as the lone-pivot. Trossard isn’t Ødegaard, but generally played the #10 with Havertz often occupying the striking positions. This allowed Timber to play a version of left-back where he looked comfortable.
This level of comfort showed.
He can do it. Still, outside of marquee matchups or injury coverage, you’d like to work toward a place where he is primarily a right-back.
🛠️ 3. Lack of deep manipulation
The final summary of the build-up structure is that:
The “swirling pivot,” in which inversion can happen from anywhere — the left-back, right-back, or an advanced midfielder — looks promising and dangerous. Distances and intent are good.
We still don’t push through the middle enough. This is likely a mixture of tactical intention and player temperament.
The purer RB inversion we saw against Newcastle caused cascading issues throughout the side, and contributed to the stasis.
So… why has the loss of Ødegaard been felt so heavily lately?
For one: I think we’ve felt the lower level of White involvement. As a right-back, he just keeps things ticking for others — always available, always where he should be, and a good balance of progressive and secure. I don’t really doubt that Timber can meet (or exceed) that in the near future, perhaps even immediately (he was stellar against Leicester), but with all the outages, things have been getting stitched together.
But the primary reason we have missed Ødegaard of late is Calafiori, who, in his own way, really served as the Ødegaard cover.
This is because he added a degree of aggressive block manipulation from the middle third. His role, in so many words, is sharing the responsibility of the LCM like this:
When he’s in the pivot, the LCM — Rice in this case — can drop down to a spot where they’re plenty comfortable to overload the press.
This, then unlocks everything. This shows how a functioning buildup on one side can lead to 1v1s on the other.
But a lot of it is the #vibes.
Here’s what I wrote in the original scouting report:
For a team so young, Arsenal can have practical, technocratic impulses. Calafiori wants shit to happen, he needs shit to happen, and I see no scenario in which he doesn’t contribute to a few viral, audacious, did-you-see-that type clips at Arsenal. That sounds trivial, but it’s the same swagger that makes Real Madrid so intimidating to face.
The build-up is fundamentally about providing the attack with advantages once the ball gets to them. You know all that pretty stuff that Brighton do deep? That’s all to create circumstances that allow their attackers to take on players 1v1. When your attackers are regularly surrounded, it’s likely because of a) game-state or b) ineffective build-up. You need somebody with the verve to move them around.
Calafiori (and Timber as a right-back) is just what the team needs on that front. When he receives a ball like the below, and is the deepest midfielder, his impulse is to drive directly at the defenders and gain commitments.
He then takes a clear risk, passing it through three players to Rice, even pinballing it through some deflecting legs.
The block is moved. Rice power-carried it forward. Martinelli steadied it. Calafiori ran an overlap. Goal.
None of that happens without the deep ambition, or without Rice providing that little outlet in the pocket.
With Timber at LB, and Partey deeper at RB, we saw very little of this against Newcastle for understandable, definable, but avoidable reasons. In matchups without a top threat at LW, you’d like to see some more MLS and Zinchenko over there.
…and Ødegaard and Calafiori, of course.
🛠️ 4. Shit passes
We all lurch for problems with easy solutions.
Just start [X player]. Just switch [Y]’s position. Just sign [Z].
Perhaps the most unsatisfying analysis is when a player does something poorly that they usually do well. Because of all the chopping-and-changing, this has certainly been the case at times for Arsenal so far: connections have gone cold, legs have been tired, and some crispness has been lost.
Why did we lose control in the second half of Shakthar? A lot of it was stuff like this.
…and this, from Saliba.
Late against Newcastle, things looked structurally promising. The team was keeping “good height” and were occupying positions where they felt comfortable. But still, we saw moments like this more than once: a missed connection between White and Nwaneri, who haven’t had a lot of time together.
Here’s Rice carrying, delivering, and losing it. He just mishit it.
Here, with some pressing applied from Newcastle, the passing patterns are fairly easy for an opponent to decipher. Kai’s pass is jumped and turned into an opportunity the other way.
Here, in Milan, Partey telegraphs one early. This isn’t the fault of dynamics, structure, tactics, or anything like that.
As of late-October, Arsenal’s deep buildup completion was 82.31%, which only was good for 12th in the league, and slightly lower than those of Arsenal’s opponents. As of today, Arsenal’s short passing is at 89.7%, which is good for 10th, and even with Manchester United. Raya is still launching goal-kicks at the highest rate in the league (72.9%).
To the eye, this has a lot to do with interrupted gameflows. The squad always seems to look better with longer periods of open play. That has been a rare sight this year.
For now, the objective is to try and get through the current period by any means possible. That hasn’t gone well from a points perspective. Chelsea feels pivotal.
After this period, the next international break will offer an opportunity for a reprieve. It includes an easier schedule and a whole lot of London. With Ødegaard coming back, and some more stable “pods” building reps, it’s not unreasonable to expect a natural improvement here.
🛠️ 5. Lack of central dribbling threat + overreliance on “same side” attacking patterns = too defensive of an attack
This one feels so obvious that it can barely be called analysis.
James Benge posted this, an updated version of the Donut of Sadness:
The first reason is clear. Arsenal are light on players who can receive in the middle and manipulate a block. Ødegaard isn’t a prototypical dribbler, but finding gaps, exploiting them, and moving the opponent around is an area in which he excels. Without him, we’ve been running out midfield trios like Rice/Merino/Havertz and Partey/Rice/Havertz. The shortcoming there is fairly self-evident.
When Nwaneri comes on and receives like this, it almost feels odd.
This is for another reason: tactical intention. It’s clear that Arteta views the middle as a danger zone because central ball losses are closer to your goal than wide ball losses. When you’re by the corner flag, it takes an extra step for the opponent to counter, and that extra time usually allows your defenders to get back.
Rice talked about this in My Game in My Words for The Athletic, describing a play against Everton.
“We’re really big on playing ‘same side’ and work on it,” Rice says. “We’re going to have an overload because there’s two players here,” he continues, pointing to White and Saka. “[…] But just that fake to initially go one way, ready to take it back the other side, it shifts everyone. So that’s why you see us as a team do that quite a lot.”
That’s all fine when you have optimal tight-space control specialists who excel in snappy, wide associations. Ødegaard and Saka provide that in spades. Others can, too — but not at the level of attackers from Real Madrid, Barcelona, or Man City.
You’ll see this starkly in this chart by Scott Willis of Cannon Stats. Man City have four times as many high-central touches as Arsenal do. It’s good for +508 more in all.
Does this strategy make it less likely for teams to counter? Probably. But there are other costs: more teams can sag out of the middle and onto our wingers. And there’s another, more ancillary issue: Arsenal are unlikely to get free kicks in these dangerous zones. Opta says we are the only team in the league without a single free-kick shot this season.
I don’t put much stock in the Mourinho comparisons, for reasons we’ll cover later. Arsenal have largely had to drop back out of circumstance. But I do think Arteta devises an attack in too defensive-minded of a headspace. If you have an all-world cleanup spine like Saliba, Gabriel, and Rice, you should take advantage of that with some increased ambition through the middle.
Where do we go from here?
Ødegaard back.
Jesus on for Trossard.
Continue upping Nwaneri’s minutes.
Simply decrease the tactical risk aversion through the middle. Pass it in there, often diagonally, and don’t feel the need to switch out of it immediately.
Moving forward, the team is absolutely short a central dribbler like Eze, Kudus, Simons, Doué, etc. With ESR gone, this should have already been addressed.
🛠️ 6. Set pieces and duels can be tiring, difficult, and prone to variance
This following graphic may cause sensory overload, but let’s try it anyway. Here’s what the general out-of-possession looked like against Liverpool.
What do we notice from the tactical intentions of both teams?
Arsenal were committing players forward with aplomb; this is not the timid pressing we’ve seen in some of the earlier matches
Liverpool offered a fairly straightforward double-pivot, with their three midfielders interchanging roles
Núñez floated around, looking to drag defenders and exploit pockets more than pure goal-hounding
The tactical intention was a mirror image of Arsenal’s. The idea was to get Partey isolated as much as possible. Within 20 seconds, the cards were on the table.
There were understandable nerves before the match, but Partey really held his own.
His duelling style — not slowly closing space, but waiting for the first moment to poke it away — worked over and over (except that one time he got megged).
On the other side, Timber was even more impressive while facing down Salah.
When Timber was on the pitch, Salah logged 1/7 attacking duels, 0/4 crosses, 0 fouls drawn, and 0 dribbles completed. His only shot was on that Merino loss that Timber had nothing to do with.
Playing on the left and in his first match back from injury, Timber was not sharp on the ball. But he compensated with a dogged intensity that shows that he can line up with anybody in the world.
In all, it was a defensive performance to be proud of — at least, before players started dropping. Per @markrstats:
On top of that, per Opta:
Arsenal have made more high-intensity pressures in the final 1/3 than any other team in the UEFA Champions League this season (543), while Kai Havertz (146) has made the most of any player. Relentless.
But you had this in the “issue” section, Billy. What gives?
This is an incredibly taxing way to play football. It is likely contributing to the fatigue and injury load. And, if the bouncing ball goes the other way, it may feel difficult to control at times.
Thanks to game-states, bad luck, injuries begetting injuries, and more, almost every aspect of Arsenal’s game has become more physically taxing.
Here’s the difference from 23-24 compared to the year so far:
Shot blocks: 2.79 → 4.60 ⬆️
Dribblers challenged: 14.3 → 17.3 ⬆️
Take-ons attempted: 17.7 → 18.8 ⬆️
Fouls: 10.3 → 12.9 ⬆️
Aerial duels: 26.3 → 27.9 ⬆️
Touches: 697.2 → 565.7 ⬇️
A silly thing I’ll keep repeating: when you pass the ball, the ball moves. When your opponent passes the ball, you move. Possession can help with fitness. With lower touches, more fouls, and more challenges, things are going to be tougher on the body. Arsenal are even getting pelted with shots at twice the rate.
This can have impacts throughout.
One thing I’m interested in is the concept of “decision fatigue” with footballers. It’s a known phenomenon in the world of psychology.
“The more choices you have to make, the more it can wear on your brain, and it may cause your brain to look for short cuts,” she added, noting that “there are four main symptoms: procrastination, impulsivity, avoidance and indecision.”
“You are either putting the decision off until later, making a rash decision based on little evidence, avoiding the decision altogether or battling back and forth between various choices,” said Dr. MacLean. “The psychological effects of decision fatigue can vary, potentially leading to difficulty making the right decisions, impulse buying or other avoidance behaviors.
“If your brain is worn down, it may cause you to become more reckless with your decision making or not think things through,” she added. It can also “cause you to simply do nothing, which can cause even more problems.”
I’ve always suspected that fatigue has a particular impact on ball-striking. I was researching it last year (days of rest vs finishing quality, etc) and the data got messy and required further work, so who knows. But I feel like a lot of xG underperformers are work-rate demons. I’m sure you can make your own list.
Tired legs may also be responsible for hits like this.
…and when players are all over the pitch, duelling constantly, you wonder if there is a point of diminishing returns for their decision-making, even if minor.
There have been a couple of times lately where Havertz has blown his assignment on a set piece, which feels unlike him, as he is usually so aware and switched on. He’d be fully within his rights to be a little drained.
Duels can be a primary strategy, but not an entire strategy. To be clear, I dig this approach in general. As I wrote when he brought on Merino:
It presents a clear “theory for the case” for how Arsenal, and not others, can win the top prizes. The club is pushing its stack of chips into the middle of the table on Arsenal’s clear advantages, instead of spreading them around on the theories of others. No half-measures are being taken. Amongst top, high-possession clubs, Arsenal can be the most aggressively pressing, physical, imposing, tall, set-piece dominating, bullying team in the world. If it works, it’ll be hard to replicate.
This is more compelling than “we’ll be like Man City, without financial doping” or “we’ll be like Real Madrid, with less star pull” or “like a more disciplined Chelsea” or “like Brighton with a budget.” And that identity can trickle into everything.
But other teams have their say. Inter and Newcastle are also some of the best duelling teams in the world. Newcastle, in particular, rolled out a lineup of behemoths. Without that first plan, and with a game so interrupted, Arsenal had trouble creating other answers to the question posed.
Regardless, sometimes you can try your best and the ball simply doesn’t bounce your way. That’s more variance than is offered in a skill like passing.
Against Liverpool, you see that the momentum changed as the injuries piled up, subs came on, and variance worsened.
This is true, too, of set pieces.
First, to score on corners you must have corners. With such a heavy investment in big boys like Havertz and Merino, that number should be ticking up in an ideal world. Right now Arsenal are creating ~1 fewer corner per 90 this year than last, which is understandable with the game-states, but still something you’d like to see change.
Against Liverpool, Arsenal only created one corner. Against Newcastle, Arsenal dominated possession in the second half, and generated six corners in all. I thought that number could have been higher, but the wingers lost some battles on the byline.
Then there’s Inter.
Watching back, here’s my analysis of the set pieces at San Siro: the corner generation was great (13 in all), the deliveries were great, the movement was great, the defending was solid, and the ball didn’t bounce in. The team basically did everything right.
That can happen with corners.
🛠️ 7. Shot selection
My feeling is that Arsenal are still being a little overprecise about ripping it.
The data on this is a little interesting. Arsenal are:
10th in shots (13.9/90)
1st in closest shots (14.7 yards on average)
8th in xG per shot (0.11)
This may imply that Arsenal are good at generating close opportunities, but can improve by increasing the volume of the opportunities, and also likely improve the quality (and angle) of the shot relative to the positions of the defenders and goalkeeper.
On the other end, Man City take the most shots in the league — but are 15th in their distance to the goal. I basically believe their bangers won them the league last year.
I’m not suggesting dramatic changes. Good shots are still good shots. I am suggesting a slightly greener light for first-touch rips and the like. These can help unsettle blocks and make them more anxious to leave their lanes to get in the way.
I’ll refer to some of my conclusions from Bangers Only, written before the year:
Chance creation (and thus, shot location) can be more diverse and central. We’d certainly like to be higher than sixth in “open play xG created” next year. By rebuilding the left and improving the access on the top of the box, Arsenal will also be able to shoot more from the place on the edge where Foden and Rodri scored on the final day. By preserving as much angle to the goalmouth as possible, you increase your chance of scoring.
Arsenal should continue to tilt their chances toward their best shooters. This sounds obvious, but for much of the year, it didn’t necessarily happen. For large stretches, Martinelli didn’t have enough access to the goal and was underperforming his normal shooting metrics; once Trossard started playing more, he got that access, and started banging them in.
As such, I think there are a few places for Arsenal to more steadily outperform xG in-house. This includes: Martinelli and Trossard crashing the middle; Ødegaard in the “Ø-zone,” where he should return if Arsenal field a double-pivot more often; Rice bangers from the middle-top of the box; Havertz headers; better shooters playing regularly; and Saka anywhere. Oh, and Nwaneri/Vieira 😜
On shot placement, there seems to be some evidence that Arsenal should hit lower, quicker, grounded strikes to the corner. I’d also argue for a slightly greener green light at the top of the box.
Let us not overcomplicate things. This is mostly about players. Sign another great ball-striker or two and prosper. In terms of overall team depth, I think Arsenal are still a touch behind the Champions League’s best on this.
🛠️ 8. Unfurling on the counter
With Merino and Calafiori on the squad, there are likely to be more bouncing balls through the middle. The order of the day, then, is to regain it and quickly unfurl on the counter. I still sense there can be improvement on this front.
This isn’t really the best example, but it did precede the Newcastle goal.
In previous weeks, we’ve fallen prey to immediate counterpresses. It’s not a big issue on its own, but it adds up.
The squad can get a little less deep, and splay out in more coordinated movements, to give the carrier more options. A little more familiarity will go a long way.
🛠️ 9. Plan B is still a work-in-progress
Before the summer kicked into gear, I outlined the changes we’d like to see on the left.
Moving forward, this left pod needs a few things:
More continuity so relationships can develop
More credible width-holding from either (or both) LB or LCM
Some more dynamic passing range and 1v1 take-on ability from this side
Ideally, you sign an LB who can credibly play in all three of thee points in this triangle; I personally don’t think this has to be a pure overlapper, because that can result in the scenario with both full-backs holding width, and that can be a little open in transition. Your CM (Rice or another) should be able to do the inside two at least; all three would be ideal.
We saw that become the top priority with the signings of Riccardo Calafiori and Mikel Merino.
Nonetheless, Arsenal are still definitely a “Plan A” team.
To some degree, this feels inevitable: Bukayo Saka is our best player, and he is going to dominate chance creation. But you’d still like to offer threat throughout.
Fortunately or unfortunately, Calafiori looks like the biggest answer here.
Against PSG, with the Timber/Calafiori duo starting at RB and LB respectively, more of the xG was generated through the left and the middle than the right.
Against Southampton, the amount of positional attacks was perfectly balanced.
Against Shakthar, Calafiori kickstarted almost all of the scoring opportunities, even if the ball was nestled on the right more often.
But, in truth, things didn’t look so imbalanced against the likes of Inter or Newcastle. Martinelli had a lot of the ball against Newcastle, though he failed to improve a bad situation.
Against Inter, Timber looked more comfortable at LB, and Martinelli led the team in Goal Probability Added, making five key passes in all. You can see the number of crosses he fired in by the end; the team knocked in 33 on the night. It was a shame that so many of them came after Merino went off.
That also leads to a point of understanding for Martinelli. When Havertz is occupying the central or left channels, Martinelli’s crossing target is usually Saka. Getting on the end of crosses is one of the only areas of Saka’s game in which he plays like an actual mortal.
I’d keep starting Martinelli, for whatever it’s worth. But Sterling’s lack of usage is certainly a concern.
🛠️ 10. The need for Ødegaard’s level of press ferocity
As my pal Bastian said:
We had one high press with Ødegaard on the pitch and it immediately looked more vicious.
There’s a slight, but noticeable difference in its level of communication and commitment.
The numbers still look fine, and there have been phases of matches in which the press looks fantastic. But to my eye, there have been more lapses and miscommunications than last year — all while fielding a press that should be qualitatively better in every way.
This up-back-through was the product of Merino and/or Partey leaving a man free on a slight miscommunication or late jump. This didn't happen a lot last year.
Earlier in the year, there was a fairly consistent lack of backup runs to support the first line of pressing, but that has improved.
Still, the objective shouldn’t be a good press, it should be a clear best-in-world outfit.
The solution? Yeah. It’s Ødegaard.
Plus, Merino getting more comfortable. Speaking of…
🛠️ 11. What do we make of Merino?
There were four direct free-kicks in the first half against Liverpool.
The first one went to Merino.
The second one also went to Merino, and he was wide open and scuffed the shot.
The third also went to Merino, but it didn’t quite hit.
The fourth was driven hard into the net for his first Arsenal goal.
I’ll repeat what I’ve said before on him.
It’s an annoying reality of the current phase. Merino is a high-level tactical brain, and carries an expert understanding of pressing systems like this — not just participating in them but orchestrating them. But he came so late — it was the end of August, a full month after Calafiori — and then was promptly injured. Since returning, he’s been playing in two different spots with a swirling cast around him. He’s visibly still feeling out the positions of teammates around him. Small gaps can open as a result. It feels like the kind of thing that can get fully rectified in a matter of weeks — it’s just a shame that those weeks weren’t in July and August.
Some other notes:
This is all coming off of the full Euros schedule that saw the likes of Rodri skip Man City’s opening matches then promptly get hurt
I watched 12-15 matches of his for the scouting report and essentially never saw him look leggy and tired. I saw him get tired in his ~20 minute debut against PSG.
The entirely of his time at LCM with Calafiori at LB is a couple dozen minutes against Shakthar.
My other note is that he’s made all of three league starts. Only two of those have been at LCM. And none of them have been with a creator in the midfield.
…and in one of those starts, he was really good! Despite an early miscue, he grew into a great game, and showed his impact by overrunning the underpowered Liverpool midfield. Plus, the goal.
In moments like this, in which the LB (Timber) pushed up, he showed one of the promises of his signing: covering the wing in the toughest assignment imaginable.
There were glimmers of the left side working exactly like it should. Here’s him holding width and finding Timber in the inside pocket.
…and some of these forward balls to the likes of Havertz and Merino.
But there have been struggles, too. He’s had clunky touches and awkward moments. He’s looked extremely off-ball, often running directly to striker spots in the box. In the press, he is feeling out his connections with his teammates.
It’s hard to overstate how stable of an environment and role he had for La Real over the past six years. All his reference points are so similar to the ones there, but slightly different.
To reference a #historic #film, his situation reminds me of a young Garth Algar seeing his friend’s basement recreated as a TV studio:
Garth Algar: I mean, we're looking down on Wayne's basement. Only that's not Wayne's basement. Isn't that weird?
Wayne Campbell: Yeah, that's weird, man, that's weird.
Garth! That was a haiku!
Whatever the particulars, it feels fair to critique the timing of his transfer. This will take some time and, with Ødegaard on the way back, Merino can ease in as a roleplayer.
🛠️ 12. Did Arsenal retreat against Liverpool?
This feels like an outdated question, but I have my notes, and they must be typed up.
My answer is, basically: no, at least not by choice.
For reference, here was Myles Lewis-Skelly’s first action after being subbed on.
Here was the pass that resulted in the counter and goal.
Here was Lewis-Skelly later, even with the threat of Salah lurking behind.
Once Gabriel went off, the backline of Partey/White/Kiwior/Timber were able to keep things largely contained. The long ball percentage went up, and some control was lost, but there were plenty of moment of pressing as well.
The pressing intensity never fell off the map, and the formation height never dropped below Liverpool’s depths in the first half.
So what happened?
It’s all about running. The underlying factors show us a lot about the Premier League in 2024:
A midfield of Rice, Merino, and Havertz could outrun Liverpool in the first half
Timber and Gabriel could run with Salah and Núñez
Then…
Szoboszlai, and tiring Arsenal legs, removed the midfield advantage
Lewis-Skelly and Kiwior (and White) could not ultimately run with Salah and Núñez
Once Gabriel went off, we saw the deterioration of the duel percentage.
We see how Szoboszlai can make Rice run like Mac Allister couldn’t.
All of this made it difficult to get the ball up to Saka in good situations. Look at the map of dribbles from the first half to the second:
That, plus pure superstardom, is what turned the game.
Again, here’s the ball that created the counter opportunity.
While there will be more hand-wringing in the later phases of this opportunity, here is where it should have been interrupted. A tired Trossard lets Alexander-Arnold sneak behind him for a 1-2. Writ large, Trossard’s defensive work rate has been good — but is one of my arguments for more time for Jesus. I would have definitely had him on before 85’.
It gets up to this phase, and Alexander-Arnold hits a genius ball on the first touch. We can critique all we want — I fundamentally don’t think this goal happens with Gabriel/Timber on the pitch — but this is such a hard ball to judge.
Kiwior lurches a little and takes himself out of the play. White doesn’t close down on Núñez or the runner, and there it is: that inevitable Salah goal. It sure felt like we could have drawn the whole thing up on a tactical board before it happened.
For the purposes of this section, though, my point is this: this goal doesn’t happen if Arsenal were camping in their box. This was a result of overambition, if anything.
We saw that level of commitment against Inter, too. Playing in the San Siro, the average position of our CBs was at the half-line.
Possession was dominated, and the ball was pinned deep over and over.
🛠️ 13. What do we make of Nwaneri?
Hey, remember this?
To many Arsenal faithful, the shot felt like more than a great moment. It felt like exactly what the team needs right now: little half-turns, dribbles, attacking ambition, and ball-striking. Anything that will unsettle a block.
As we’ve covered before, that shot was no aberration. By this count, he has more out-of-the-box goals in the last 365 days (7) than every Arsenal player had last season (6). He was particularly accurate from that zone.
I got caught up on a lot of his tape this summer and it was hard to contain some of what I thought of it. As a #dad, I am hesitant and uncomfortable about playing a tiny role in building buzz, expectation, or critique of an under-18 player if they’re not already performing on the senior level. I’m not perfect, but I prefer to stay quiet.
On top of the bangers, what you’ll see is a unique blend of ambition and retention. This will obviously get tougher as he scales up the levels, but you’ll see that the last 13 times he sought to dribble a left-back, he kept the ball 12 times, and got 7 shots off (with four on target, and two goals). This is because of his low balance, ability to shield, and quick anticipatory touches.
He’s not a pure pick-and-shoot player either. While I wouldn’t project him as a deep orchestrator, he’s capable in lower areas, can turn and drive, and pick out free runners with weighted touches.
These skills combine to force a stretch like the below earlier this year. Look at the rightmost column.
His big adjustments, from my vantage point, will be the following:
Association: I’ve wondered if this would scale immediately because some younger players are crying out for teammates with more tactical nous than their agemates. Still, there’s been a lot of rotation, and feeling out the impulses of others is a journey, as we saw against Newcastle.
Out-of-possession: I don’t think he projects as an immediate liability. His level of application is good. It’s probably a nice sign that Arteta has deployed him in multiple roles, including in the block next to the #6. Still, if you want to earn minutes, you don’t want the trade-off to be too severe.
Deeper losses: This is probably my biggest concern. He’s accustomed to being able to dribble everyone, everywhere. The laws of physics mean that is going to be tougher against Amadou Onana than an 18-year-old.
It’s a testament to his talent that many Arsenal fans are frustrated with his usage when he’s already made 8 appearances and 2 starts across competitions as a 17-year-old.
My feeling was that those games against Leicester and Southampton felt made for him, but I’m careful to ease his development otherwise. It’s a delicate balance. A healthy combination of immersion and caution is advisable.
Still, I would say … be excited.
🔥 Final thoughts
Top players are difficult to replace. Still, no player is a panacea — eh, maybe some are — and the team's struggles without Ødegaard are both a testament to his quality and a deficiency in squad-building. It feels clear to me that one more player who can move around a block is (and was) necessary. It also feels clear that while some tactical foundations are as strong as ever (rotations, distances, etc), some tactical intentions need polishing — basically, attacking from a place of attack-mindedness.
There are plenty of logical reasons to believe things will improve from here. Without Rodri, Man City have durable questions of their own, and it's not controversial to say that Arsenal can and should be the team that racks up the most points from today forward. But, as Unforgiven tells us, deserve's got nothing to do with it. You have to prove it on the pitch—variance, injuries, schedule, unluckiness, and all.
The corridor is narrower than it was before, and that’s no small issue. But it’s a corridor nonetheless.
It’s time to rack up some points.
From the ashes of Edu’s BBQ, Billy’s BBQ was born. Take up the tongs. Flip the steak. You’re our Director of Football now.
Billy’s BBQ is a no brainer.
Keep cooking chef.